3-2-1 backups
Three copies, two media, one off-site. Immutable or offline beats a snapshot the ransomware also encrypted.
30 entries
Three copies, two media, one off-site. Immutable or offline beats a snapshot the ransomware also encrypted.
NIST block cipher. 128-bit blocks, keys of 128, 192, or 256 bits. The algorithm is solved. Mode and key handling are the work.
AES in Galois/Counter Mode. Confidentiality plus an integrity tag. This is the AES you actually want.
Physically isolated. No cable, no Wi-Fi, no 'just this jump host' to the internet. Removable media is still a path if you let it be.
Software that looks for known-bad and obvious malice, then tries to stop and clean it. Necessary. Not sufficient.
Everything a hostile party can reach: apps, IT, OT, services. Bigger surface, more raffle tickets.
A copy stored somewhere else so you can restore after loss. If ransomware can reach it with the same credentials, it is not a backup.
Jump host. The one box allowed to administer the rest. Harden it like it holds the keys.
Which certificate authorities may issue for this domain. A DNS policy, not a certificate.
Three DNS records. Receivers use them together so your domain is harder to wear.
Signatures on DNS data. Authenticity and integrity of answers. Not a VPN. Not HTTPS.
DLP. Stop or log sensitive data leaving through the paths you actually instrumented. Policy plus telemetry, not a magic classifier.
The password the vendor shipped. Fine for unboxing. Malpractice if it is still there at go-live.
Stacked controls so one failure is not game over. Redundancy, not twelve dashboards of the same alert.
ASD's baseline of eight mitigation strategies. Maturity 0 to 3. The work is picking a level you can actually hold.
How to show you actually did the Essential Eight. Scope, artefact, date, owner. Overall maturity is the weakest strategy, not the average.
A filter on the way in and out, driven by rules. Default allow is a very expensive switch.
A header that tells the browser: this host is HTTPS only, for a while. Preload is a one-way door.
Only the access required, only for as long as required. Standing admin is standing blast radius.
TLS where both sides present a certificate. The server is not the only one who has to prove who they are.
Access only to the data the role actually requires. Broad file shares are a rumour mill with NTFS.
Cut the network into smaller pieces. Segregation is the rule set between them. Flat is a gift.
Generates unique secrets and stores them in a vault. One strong unlock. Not a spreadsheet called passwords_final.
A vendor fix for a hole or a defect. Installing it is patching. Explaining why you did not is an exception with an expiry date.
PAM the program: vault the admin passwords, broker the sessions, record them. Not the same as Linux PAM, the Unix login modules. People say both.
Someone who can change or sidestep security controls. Developers who can bypass a guardrail count.
A paddock for untrusted code. If it explodes, the paddock takes it. Production is not a paddock.
You can outsource the work. You cannot outsource the risk. Cloud shared responsibility, IRAP evidence, and ISM procurement sit on the same desk as the incident.
Find, rank, fix, check. Known-exploited and exposure beat a 400-page scanner PDF.
WAF. A reverse proxy that tries to stop common web attacks before the app. Rules, not a rewrite of the application.
Definitions informed by ASD's ACSC glossary. cyber.gov.au glossary